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Abstract: The conclusions of Barbey & Sloman (B&S) crucially depend
on evidence for different representations of statistical information.
Unfortunately, a muddled distinction made among these representations
calls into question the authors’ conclusions. We clarify some notions of
statistical representations which are often confused in the literature.
These clarifications, combined with new empirical evidence, do not
support a dual-process model of judgment.
We disagree with Barbey & Sloman’s (B&S’s) claim that data on
Bayesian reasoning support their dual-process model of human
judgment. First, we clarify the dimensions along which statistical
information can be expressed, and then point to how this
common conceptual confusion can influence B&S’s interpret-
ation of existing data. Second, we explain how new evidence con-
tradicts this model.
1. Statistical representation. Statistical information can be
represented in multiple ways along two orthogonal dimensions:
the number of events and the numerical format. First, the
information may concern only one event (single-event probability)
or a set of events (frequency). For example, the probability that
a person has a positive test if she is ill is a single-event
probability, in contrast to the frequency of people having a
positive test among those who are ill. Second, the numerical
information can be represented as percentages (20%); fractions
(20/100); real numbers between 0 and 1 (0.2); or pairs of
integers (“20 chances out of 100” for single-event probabilities,
and “20 people out of 100” for frequencies).
Consider now a Bayesian task of computing the probability of
a hypothesis H, given the data D, such as the probability of being
ill, given the result of a test. In this context, there is yet another
orthogonal dimension along which the statistical information can
vary: the information can be expressed in a conjunctive or in a
normalized format. The conjunctive format gives the relevant
conjunctive information P (H & D) and P (not-H & D), or P (H
& D) and P (D). In this case the Bayesian computations are
rather simple (see Eq. 1):
P(H jD) ¼ P(H&D)
P(H&D)þ P(not-H&D) ¼
P(H&D)
P(D)
(1)
Alternatively, information can be expressed in a normalized
format giving the normalized information P (D j H) and P (D j
not-H), in addition to P (H) – and not giving the relevant con-
junctive information. The normalized format complicates com-
puting the Bayesian results (see Eq. 2):
P(H jD) ¼ P(D jH)P(H)
P(D jH)P(H)þ P(D j notH)(1 P(H)) (2)
Because the number of events and conjunctive/normalized
format dimensions are orthogonal, one can give statistical infor-
mation in a Bayesian task in four possible ways, each of which
can be represented as percentages, fractions, real numbers or
pair of integers (see Table 1 for examples of Bayesian tasks,
each represented in different numerical formats).
Confusion among these three orthogonal dimensions is
common in the literature and poses particular problems in the
Table 1 (Barton et al.). Taxonomy of statistical information: examples of Bayesian tasks
Normalized format Conjunctive format
Single event
probabilities
A 40-year-old woman who participates in routine
screening has 10 out of 1,000 chances to have
breast cancer. [P (H)]
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for a 40-year-old
woman who participates in a routine screening. [P (H)]
If such a woman has breast cancer, she has 800
out of 1,000 chances to have a positive
mammography [P (D j H)]
The probability that such a woman has a positive
mammography and has breast cancer is 0.8% [P (H & D)]
If such a woman does not have breast cancer, she
has 96 out of 1,000 chances to have a positive
mammography. [P (D j not-H)]
The probability that she has a positive mammography and
does not have breast cancer is 9.5%. [P (not-H & D)]
Frequencies A proportion of 0.01 of women at age 40 who
participate in routine screening have breast
cancer. [P (H)]
(labeled Natural frequencies when represented as pairs of
integers)
10 out of 1,000 women at age forty who participate in
routine screening have breast cancer [P (H)]
A proportion 0.8 of women with breast cancer
will have positive mammographies. [P (D j H)]
8 out of these 1,000 women have a positive mammography
and have breast cancer [P (H & D)]
A proportion 0.096 of women without breast
cancer will also have positive
mammographies. [P (D j not-H)]
95 out of these 1,000 women have a positive mammography
and do not have breast cancer [P (not-H & D)]
Note. Each of the four numerical formats can apply to the four probability/frequency and normalized/conjunctive combinations. Here, we
arbitrarily assigned numerical formats for each cell.
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B&S target article, because the authors draw false conclusions on
this basis. First, they mention “natural frequency formats that
were not partitioned into nested set relations” (B&S, sect. 2.4,
para. 2). But non-partitioned frequency formats are simply fre-
quencies expressed in a normalized format; therefore, natural
frequencies must be partitioned into nested set relations. Conse-
quently, B&S’s critiques of the so-called non-partitioned natural
frequencies apply only to normalized frequencies (i.e., frequen-
cies in a normalized format). Second, a sentence like “33% of
all Americans will have been exposed to Flu” (target article,
Table 5) concerns a whole population, not a single individual;
therefore, it conveys frequencies, not single-event probabilities,
contrary to the authors’ equating of percentages (referring to
the numerical representation) and single-event probabilities
(referring to the number of events). B&S misinterpret a key
result of Brase (2002b), who showed that subjects perceived
simple frequencies (i.e., frequencies represented as pairs of inte-
gers) as clearer, more understandable, and more impressive than
single-event probabilities represented as non-integer numbers
(Brase 2002b, pp. 388–89).
B&S contrast what they call “theoretical frameworks” (sect.
1.2, para. 2) based on natural frequency representations with
the “nested set hypothesis” (sect. 2.10, para. 5). However, some
of these contrasts appear a bit artificial. Consider the Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage (1995) study, which predicted and showed that
natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian inference. B&S claim
this effect results from the clarification of the nested-sets struc-
ture of the problem. But Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) had
already made a more specific, related argument, stating that
the facilitation of natural frequencies results from simplifying
the Bayesian computations by giving the relevant conjunctive
information. B&S’s idea that this facilitation results from the clar-
ification of the nested-sets structure of the problem stands more
in opposition to the use of an evolutionary argument (Cosmides
& Tooby 1996) to predict the facilitating effect of natural fre-
quencies, than in opposition to Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s argu-
ment. However, some of the arguments used by B&S against this
evolutionary stance are not valid. For example, they say that since
both normalized and natural “frequencies exist in nature, it is
unclear why only frequencies of the latter type are deemed
important” (target article, Note 5). This is not true: Natural fre-
quencies “exist in nature” in the sense that, in a natural sample
of the population, counting the number of individuals belonging
to the groups H & D and not-H & D yields natural frequencies
(conjunctive information); whereas, counting in such a natural
sample cannot result in normalized information that does not
contain the conjunctive information. Therefore, normalized fre-
quencies, which only give the normalized information, do not
exist in nature in this sense. So, an evolutionary argument that
predicts the facilitating effect of natural frequencies, but no
such effect for normalized frequencies, can be defended
against this charge that both normalized and natural frequencies
exist in nature (even if one sees this evolutionary argument as
speculative and feels uncomfortable about making precise pre-
dictions on this basis).
2. Facilitating effects. B&S propose a general dual-process
model of judgment, which denies any facilitating effect of
frequencies per se, because “facilitation is a product of general-
purpose reasoning processes” (sect. 1.2.5, para. 1). As evidence
against such an effect, B&S cite Girotto and Gonzalez’s (2001)
facilitating effect when the information is given as “number of
chances” in a conjunctive format, which is a way of expressing
single-event probabilities. Recent work by Brase (2007),
however, demonstrates that many people interpret such chances
as natural frequencies, despite instructions to the contrary.
Moreover, those who interpret chances as natural frequencies
have higher rates of success than those who judge the
information as single-event probabilities. This suggests that
frequencies can have a facilitating effect in some circumstances,
in addition to the facilitating effect of computational simplicity.
If this facilitating effect of frequencies is confirmed, it would
make the dual-process model much more difficult to defend.
Conclusion.Though we do not dismiss the idea of a dual-process
model outright, we think that B&S have not made a robust
argument in support of such a model. The authors misinterpret
data used to reject alternatives to the nested-set hypothesis.
Further, the connection between the nested-set hypothesis and
the dual-process model of judgment is not as crisp as one would
like. Perhaps this is due to the rather vague nature of the dual-
process model itself (cf. the criticisms of Gigerenzer & Regier
1996). The general project of building such a model sounds
exciting, but we look forward to a more rigorous, clearly defined
(and therefore falsifiable) dual-process model of judgment.
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Abstract: The tendency to neglect base-rates in judgment under
uncertainty may be “notorious,” as Barbey & Sloman (B&S) suggest,
but it is neither inevitable (as they document; see also Koehler 1996)
nor unique. Here we would like to point out another line of evidence
connecting ecological rationality to dual processes, the failure of
individuals to appropriately judge cumulative probability.
Recent data in studies by McCloy and colleagues (McCloy et al.
2007; McCloy et al., submitted) show that judgment of cumulat-
ive, disjunctive risk (i.e., the probability of avoiding an adverse
event over a period of time during which one continually
engages in a risky activity) benefits from presentation in a fre-
quency, rather than a probability, format (McCloy et al., sub-
mitted). It does this in a similar manner to the way in which
judgments of conditional probability avoid the base-rate neg-
lect fallacy if presented in natural frequency format (Gigerenzer
& Hoffrage 1995). Further, training in translation from prob-
ability to frequency formats shows similar improvements rela-
tive to baseline for both types of judgment (McCloy et al.
2007). However, the effects of both format and training are
mimicked by presenting information in a partitive or “nested”
set structure (in our studies, diagrammatically represented by
probability trees rather than Euler circles). This suggests that
similar processes may be involved in both problem types, and
we applaud Barbey & Sloman (B&S) for attempting to break
down the nature of those processes rather than remaining satis-
fied with a “natural frequency” label. However, we do not
believe that B&S have (yet) produced a full and complete
account of the means by which dual processes may produce
rationality within certain given ecologies.
One worry is the assertion that people do not have an (evolved
or otherwise) capacity to encode frequency information. This is a
claim concerning a failure to observe a particular capability and
might reflect failures in the observational technique employed
as much as a failure in the capability itself. The data reviewed
by B&S are based upon individuals’ inability to produce, on
demand, explicit knowledge obtained of frequencies from epi-
sodes of incidental learning. This is known to be problematic
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